Appendix A2 · Context for §3 of the main paper · May 2026
What the customer buys
Vehicle B rests on stabilised utilisation of 78 per cent. This note explains, from the customer’s side, what is billed, why one customer’s demand is bursty, and why pooling many customers is what fills a floor. Nothing here changes the decision.
What gets billed
Only the middle of the data flow is billed. What goes in and what comes back belong to the customer; the GPU-hours of work between them are the billable line.
| Segment | What it is | Whose it is |
|---|---|---|
| Input | A prompt, a query, a document, raw data | The customer’s own |
| Process · compute | GPU-hours of work done | The only thing billed |
| Output | A token, an answer, an image, a prediction | The customer’s own |
The operator’s side of the same flow, on the main paper’s Vehicle A basis:
| Operator line | Value | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Inputs · power, space, capital | 45 m per MW | Model, Assumptions: capex per MW |
| Process · operating cost | 22% of revenue | Model, Assumptions: opex ratio |
| The bill · anchor rent | 5.31 m per MW per yr | Model, Assumptions: 4.5 baseline × 1.18 premium |
Market context for what the customer pays downstream, from v3 Ch.7: USD 2–4 per million output tokens at frontier; USD 1.50–3 per H100 GPU-hour at retail. Context only, not underwriting inputs.
One customer is bursty; many together are not
A single customer’s compute demand runs in bursts: morning ramp, midday peak, evening peak, overnight floor. A fleet sized to that customer’s own peak sits idle most of the time. Pool several customers with different busy periods and the peaks land on one another’s troughs.
| Fleet basis | Average utilisation | Consequence |
|---|---|---|
| One customer, fleet sized to its own peak | ~30% | The other ~70 per cent of capacity is paid for and idle |
| Many customers, pooled | ~70% | One customer’s peak is another’s trough |
Source: v3 Ch.7 illustration. These are customer-side figures. The main paper’s Vehicle B underwrites stabilised utilisation of 78 per cent of sellable capacity, retiring below about 70 and failing below about 60 at central pricing (§3). The two sets answer different questions and are not to be netted against each other.
The gap between those two numbers is the product. The pooling is the operator’s craft, and it is the structural reason a floor can be kept usefully full and the reason the service margin in Vehicle B exists at all.
Main paper · The margin Vehicle B captures: §2 · The utilisation assumption it rests on: §3
When ownership pays, and when renting does
Whether a customer should own compute or rent it turns on one number: sustained utilisation of the fleet. Below the crossover the chip is idle too often to amortise, and the all-in cost of build per useful GPU-hour exceeds the rental rate. Above it, build undercuts rent; that takes a constant workload or a strategic mandate. Almost every customer lives below the line.
| Sustained utilisation | Build, per useful GPU-hour | Reading |
|---|---|---|
| 30% | ~USD 7 | Rent wins; most customers sit here or below on their own |
| 50% | ~USD 4 | Rent wins |
| ~67% | ~USD 3 | Crossover: the chip is amortised |
| 80% | ~USD 2.50 | Build wins; constant load or strategic mandate |
| 95% | ~USD 2 | Build wins |
Source: v3 Ch.7. The ~67 per cent is the customer’s build-or-rent threshold, not the facility’s utilisation assumption; it explains why customers rent, while §3’s 78 per cent is what the operator must sustain once they do.
What the boutique tier monetises is the distance between a customer’s ~30 per cent on its own and the pooled ~70 per cent: the same chip, paid for and idle alone, profitable when pooled.
The investor read
Your peak is everyone else’s trough. That arbitrage is what a datacentre operator sells. The chips age in three years; the pooled demand had better not. Whether it does is the question the main paper prices in §3 and tests at the gates in §4.
Main paper · The load-bearing assumption: §3